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1 Introduction
In this article, I discuss reasons why we consider nonmanipulability to be an im-
portant property in the context of social choice. Nonmanipulability of a social
choice rule (simply, a rule) has been one of the most important topics in the theory
of social choice,1 but its significance might not be clear to some researchers out-
side the field. As a researcher of nonmanipulability, I try to explain why I believe
nonmanipulability to be an important property of rules.
In Section 2, I formally define the most famous formulation of nonmanipula-
bility, i.e, stmtegy-proofi2ess. In Section 3, I discuss the significance of nonmanip-
ulability and recent researches.
lSee Barber\‘a (2010) for a survey.
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2 Basic notation and definitions
Let $N=\{1, \ldots, n\}$ be a finite set of agents, and $X$ be a finite set of altema-
tives. For example, in the context of voting, $N$ is a set of voters and $X$ is a set of
candidates. Let $\mathcal{L}$ be the set of all linear orders on $X$ . Elements of $\mathcal{L}$ represent
preferences. For each $i\in N$ , each Rg $\in \mathcal{L}$ , and each $x,$ $y\in X,$ $xR_{\dot{\eta}}y$ means
that for agent $i,$ $x$ is at least as good as $y^{2}$ Let $\mathcal{L}^{N}$ denote the set of all $n$-mples
$R=(R_{1}, \ldots, R_{n})$ , where $R_{\dot{\eta}}\in \mathcal{L}$ for each $i\in N$ . Elements of $\mathcal{L}^{N}$ are preference
profiles. A $mle$ is a function from $\mathcal{L}^{N}$ into $X$ . Generic notation for a rule is $f$ .
We say that agent $i$ manipulates a social choice if
(i) he reports a false preference relation, and
(ii) as a result, a social choice changes from the one under the true preference
relation.
Thus, generally, misrepresentation is not equivalent to manipulation. (Misrepre-
sentation does not necessarily change the social choice.)
A rule is nonmanipulable if each agent never manipulates a social choice under
some assumption on agents’ behavior.
Assumption (throughout the paper): Given $R_{-i}=(R_{1}, \ldots, h_{-1}, \kappa_{+1}, \ldots, R_{n})$ ,
agent $i$ whose true preference relation is $R_{\dot{\eta}}$ reports a false preference relation $R_{i}’$
only if $f(R_{i}’, R_{-i})\neq f(R_{\dot{\eta}}, R_{-i})$ .
Under this assumption, misrepresentation is equivalent to manipulation.
A representative notion of nonmanipulability is strategy-proofness.
A mle $f$ is strategy-proof if for each $R\in \mathcal{L}^{N}$ , each $i\in N$ , and each $R_{i}’\in \mathcal{L}$ ,
$f(R)R_{\dot{\eta}}f(R_{i}’, R_{-i})$ ,
2Each linear order can be considered as a ranking of the altematives without any ties between
distinct altematives. Thus, $xR_{i}y$ and $yR_{4}x$ if and only if $x=y$ .
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where $(R_{i}’, R_{-i})$ is the preference profile obtained by replacing $R_{\dot{\eta}}$ in $R$ by $R_{i}^{l}$ .
In the above definition of strategy-proofness, $R_{i}$ is interpreted as agent $i$ ’s true
preference relation, and $R_{i}’$ is interpreted as agent $i$ ’s false preference relation.
Then, the relation $f(R)R_{\eta}\cdot f(R_{i}’, R_{-i})$ says that reporting $R_{i}’$ is not beneficial for
agent $i$ regardless of what the other agents report. (Remember that the choice of
$R$ was arbitraly.) It is reasonable to assume that the agents report their preferences
sincerely when misrepresentation of preferences is not profitable. Thus, strategy-
proofiness is a property which makes the mle designer reasonably conclude that the
rule is nonmanipulable.
It would be safe to say that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973;
Satterthwaite, 1975) is the starting point of the theory of manipulation. The theo-
rem says that under mild conditions, strategy-proofness is achieved only by dicta-




I do not intend to claim that nonmanipulability should be a universally critical
property of a rule. Whether nonmanipulability is a critical property of a rule or not
depends on the objective of the mle designer. I consider the following two types of
objectives.
First, consider the designer who wants each social choice to have some “nice”
relation to the agents’ true preferences. For him, a rule describes a desirable rela-
tionship between the agents’ preferences and social choices. To achieve the $mle$ , it
is necessary to elicit true preferences from the agents.
On the other hand, if the designer’s objective is to construct a rule which re-
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sponds “nicely” to the reported preferences, then nonmanipulability is not an im-
portant property at all. For the designer, a mle describes a desirable relationship
between the reported preferences and social choices. Thus, there is no need to elicit
tme preferences from the agents.
There is no theory according to which one of the two attitudes of the designer is
superior to the other. Thus, whether nonmanipulability matters or not depends on
the designer’s subjective opinion about what a social choice should be related to.
Nevertheless, in the following, I argue that economists, or more broadly, social sci-
entists tend to take the former viewpoint, and this is the reason why manipulation
is a significant subject of research.
3.2 Need for true preferences
Many axioms of mles refer to agents’ preferences. As a representative example,
consider Pareto efficiency. For each $R\in \mathcal{L}^{N},$ $x\in X$ is Pareto efficient (simply,
efficient) if there is no $y\in X\backslash \{x\}$ such that $xR_{\dot{\eta}}y$ for each $i\in N$ . (Remember that
$R_{\dot{\eta}}$ is a linear order. Because $x$ and $y$ are distinct, $xR_{\dot{\eta}}y$ means that $x$ is preferred
to $y.)$ A mle $f$ is efficient if for each $R\in \mathcal{L}^{N},$ $f(R)$ is efficient.3 The following
simple arguments show that we usually interpret $R_{\dot{\eta}}$ as agent $i$ ’s tme preferences
when we discuss efficiency of altematives.
Let each agent $i$ choose one linear order $R_{\dot{\eta}}$ randomly Rom $\mathcal{L}$ . (It is possible
that $R_{\dot{\eta}}$ happens to be the agent $i$ ’s tme preference relation, but generally, it is not
necessarily the tme one.) Let $R$ be the profile of them. Each preference relation
in $R$ is nothing to do with agents’ tme preferences. Then, most researchers would
agree that finding an efficient altemative with respect to $R$ is just a mathematical
exercise, and that as economists, we do not put an importance on such exercises.
3This notion is often called weak Pareto efficiency. Because we do not consider weak orders,
there is no difference between Pareto efficiency and weak Pareto efficiency in this article.
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We are interested in realizing an efficient altemative with respect to a profile $R$ only
if $R_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $R_{n}$ are agents’ true preferences. Therefore, we need to elicit information
on tme preferences from the agents.
4 Present situation and recent researches
Strategy-proofiness has been a central axiom for nonmanipulability. However, in
many situations, we have impossibility results with strategy-proofness, i.e., every
acceptable or plausible mle violates stmtegy-proofness. Thus, we cannot recom-
mend mles based on strategy-proofness. Although impossibility theorems should
be the starting point for further researches, unfortunately, we do not have satisfac-
tory solutions to many of them. Manipulation is a serious problem in social choice,
and we cannot deviate from making social choice. Therefore, we have to find a
class of acceptable mles which are less susceptible to manipulation.
There are several lines of researches. Maus, Peters, and Storcken (2007a,b,c,d)
count the number of the profiles at which profitable $mi$ srepresentation occur. Bar-
bie, Puppe, and Tasn\’adi (2006) and Sanver (2009) find domains under which fixed
mles are strategy-proof. Campbell and Kelly (2009, 2010) consider gains and
losses from manipulation. Sato (2011a,b) considers the reluctance to make large
lies. However, it is clear that there is still much to be done.
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